Should Anti-Natalists Strive to Improve the World?

Abstract

Anti-natalism is a controversial thesis in procreative ethics that says it is always, or almost always, impermissible to procreate. A recent challenge to anti-natalists suggests that since they are committed to the extinction of the human species, it is unclear why they should care about environmental preservation and protection. This is because the strongest practical reasons in favour of environmental care are based on concern for future generations, something anti-natalists do not want to exist. If anything, then, even if the anti-natalist does not have reasons to actively destroy the environment, they have few practical reasons to care about environmental destruction or to modify their behaviour. I show that this argument is flawed because while anti-natalism enables extinction, it does not necessarily support it. Adopting anti-natalism might result in extinction but it does not require aiming at it. Even if no lives are worth starting, many are worth continuing such that the anti-natalist can reasonably hope for significant life-extension or immortality. There are also many reasons that exist right now to care about the environment. Finally, this argument may entail rejecting the Principle of Double Effect. I then explore the extent to which a structurally similar argument could succeed against anti-natalism with respect to improving the world more generally, beyond merely environmental concerns. I conclude that there is no way to do so that presents a significant epistemic or practical challenge to anti-natalism. Anti-natalists can coherently strive to improve the world.