<b>Inter-agency collaboration and the effectiveness of financial crime control in Nigeria</b>

Abstract

Nigeria's financial crime control hinges on effective collaboration between the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and specialised agencies the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), yet persistent jurisdictional conflicts, resource shortages, and institutional silos undermine enforcement outcomes. Anchored in Institutional Theory, this mixed-methods study examines inter-agency collaboration practices, institutional constraints, and their impact on financial crime control effectiveness. Using a convergent parallel design, quantitative surveys (n=148) from NPF Special Fraud Unit officers, EFCC/ICPC personnel, forensic/legal experts, and Ibadan residents captured perceptions, while qualitative interviews (n=15-20 key informants) explored operational realities. Findings reveal ad hoc collaboration (69.6% report poor communication), dominated by jurisdictional overlaps (62.9%), resource constraints (71%), and political interference (62.8%). Collaboration quality positively correlates with enforcement outcomes (r=0.563, p<0.01), explaining 32% variance, though low public awareness (62.8%) limits deterrence. Institutional Theory illuminates path-dependent norms favouring agency autonomy over synergy, reflecting isomorphic proliferation without functional integration. Unlike Singapore's unified protocols or Hong Kong's ICAC model, Nigeria exhibits symbolic compliance formal mandates exist without supportive practices. Results confirm Nwogwugwu & Odeyemi (2021) on fragmentation while extending Levi & Maguire (2004) to developing contexts. Policy recommendations include legislative jurisdiction clarification, national Integrated Case Management Systems, dedicated coordination funding, and mandatory inter-agency secondments.