article · African Journal of Empirical Research
Since independence, Zambia has utilized National Development Plans (NDPs) to guide its socio-economic trajectory. However, a recurring “implementation gap” has frequently rendered these plans aspirational rather than achievable. Anchored in new institutional economics, specifically based on Besley and Persson’s theory of fiscal capacity and Douglass North’s concept of path dependence, this study posits that this historical underperformance is not merely the result of external macroeconomic shocks but a profound structural flaw: the decoupling of development ambition from sovereign extractive capacity. This study employs a convergent parallel mixed-methods research design. The target population is the whole population of Zambia based on economic data utilized. Through a longitudinal analysis of revenue strategies across NDPs (1 through 8), this research identifies a cyclical pattern of fiscal vulnerability driven by a rentier-state reliance on volatile mineral rents and external debt. This trajectory starts from the “fiscal illusion” of the copper-dependent early years to the “financing fallacy” of the Eurobond era, sustained by a critical institutional asymmetry: the presence of a legally binding Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) without a corresponding Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS). Consequently, recent plans remain fiscally exposed to an entrenched “expenditure bias.” To break this persistent cycle as Zambia approaches the 9th National Development Plan (9NDP), this paper argues for a paradigm shift toward a "revenue-first" planning architecture anchored in a robust domestic resource mobilization (DRM) strategy. The study recommends a legislative synchronization of the NDP with a binding MTRS to serve as an “institutional lock” against unfunded mandates. Furthermore, it advocates transitioning from generalized funding assumptions to the sector-wide integration of pre-secured revenue streams, such as formal Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and carbon credits, while prioritizing the formalization of the informal sector and treating governance as a quantifiable fiscal instrument to ensure sustainable, sovereign economic growth.
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DOI: 10.51867/ajernet.7.1.104
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