Do Acts of Corruption Committed by Officials in Charge of Municipal Financial Management Reduce Local Public Revenue? A Case Study From Cameroon

Abstract

This article analyses the effect of acts of corruption committed by officials in charge of the financial management of municipalities on the mobilization of local public revenue in Cameroon. From a sample of 213 communes out of the 360 in Cameroon, we specify and estimate a panel data model using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method over the period 2010–2020. Our results show that corruption measured by convictions of officials in charge of the financial management of municipalities by the financial jurisdiction of accounts in Cameroon reduces local public revenue. Our results identify tax compliance captured through access to education, health and average per capita income as the main transmission channels. The study calls for the intensification of controls on the financial management of municipalities and the strengthening of sanctions imposed on public officials who have been convicted of financial embezzlement.