Detection of False Data Injection on Distributed Secondary Control in DC Islanded Microgrid

Abstract

The concept of Distributed Secondary Control within DC Islanded Microgrids has emerged as a potential solution to address the issue of failure bottlenecks associated with Centralized Control mechanisms. Nevertheless, the incorporation of communication links among various Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) during the implementation of Secondary Control introduces a susceptibility to cyber-attacks, which, in turn, poses a substantial threat to both grid stability and control performance. Consequently, the timely and accurate detection of these cyber-attacks assumes paramount. So, this paper demonstrates the impact of false data injection on the functioning of Distributed Secondary Control. Furthermore, the utilization of a statistical technique known as Kullback-Leibler Divergence for the identification of such attacks on secondary control system is proposed. The application of this method serves to effectively identify instances where DERs have been compromised by cyber-attacks utilizing just related neighbors’ measurements. Finally, to validate the efficacy of the proposed control approach and to illustrate the consequences of false data injection on the control system, a comprehensive simulation using MATLAB Simulink is presented on a MVDC Microgrid. This simulation offers insights into the performance of the control system under normal conditions and its vulnerability to false data injection-induced disruptions.