Corporate Governance and Tax Aggressiveness: The Moderating Role of Audit Quality

Abstract

Tax-aggressive behavior by firms can undermine tax revenues, corporate transparency, and overall economic governance. Corporate governance mechanisms are increasingly recognized as critical tools for mitigating such behavior, particularly in emerging markets such as Morocco. This study investigates how corporate governance structures influence the reduction in tax aggressiveness in a developing-country context, while also assessing the moderating role of audit quality. Using financial data from firms listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange, the hypotheses are tested through OLS regression with firm and year fixed effects to examine the impact of board characteristics and audit quality on tax aggressiveness. The results show that the separation of the CEO and chairman roles and larger board size significantly reduce tax-aggressive behavior. Moreover, audit quality strengthens the negative relationship between board size and tax aggressiveness, with higher-quality audits further constraining aggressive tax practices. Additionally, ownership concentration is associated with higher tax aggressiveness, reflected in lower effective tax rates, whereas board independence exhibits no significant association with tax aggressiveness (p-value = 0.500879). Overall, the findings suggest that robust corporate governance and high-quality audits effectively mitigate tax-aggressive practices among Moroccan listed firms. This study contributes novel evidence from the Moroccan context, highlighting governance structures and audit mechanisms most effective at curbing such behavior. Policymakers and regulators are encouraged to promote stronger governance frameworks and enhance audit quality standards, while firms should reinforce these mechanisms to improve tax compliance and transparency