Assessing the Effects of Stakeholders' Weights on Conflict Resolution in a Three‐Country River Sharing Model

Abstract

ABSTRACT Building on a well‐established dynamic model of transboundary river sharing, this paper examines how variations in relative negotiating power influence water allocations, conflict intensity, and stabilization time among three riparian states: two downstream countries (A and B) and one upstream country (C). Each country's combined political, economic, and social leverage is captured by a weighting coefficient (w a , w b , or w c ). Through a comprehensive sensitivity analysis, these weights are varied across their feasible range, and each scenario is simulated over 60 time steps. For every weight combination, the equilibrium water share received by A, B, and C is recorded, an aggregate measure of contestation as a proxy for conflict intensity and the time required to reach dynamic equilibrium. Results indicate that modest increases in upstream leverage (w c ) yield disproportionately higher allocations for C, amplify contestation among A and B, and prolong convergence times. In contrast, strengthening downstream leverage (w a or w b ) promotes more equitable sharing, dampens overall contestation, and accelerates attainment of steady state. Sets of leverage combinations that optimally balance fairness, minimize conflict, and allow rapid stabilization are identified. Our findings underscore the critical role of relative stakeholder power in shaping transboundary water outcomes and provide policymakers with a quantitative framework to assess institutional reforms—such as water‐market mechanisms or compensation schemes—that effectively recalibrate stakeholder leverage to achieve stable, reasonable water sharing. The study provides policymakers with a quantitative framework to assess how power asymmetries influence allocation equity, conflict, and stability in transboundary basins, enabling evaluation of governance reforms, treaty provisions, and policy instruments such as compensation schemes or water markets.