An unjustly neglected theory of semantic reference

Abstract

Abstract There is a simple, intuitive theory of the semantic reference of proper names that has been unjustly neglected. This is the view that semantic reference is conventionalized speakers reference , i.e. the view that a name semantically refers to an object if, and only if, there exists a convention to use the name to speaker-refer to that object. The theory can be found in works dealing primarily with other issues (e.g. Stine in Philos Stud 33:319–337, 1977; Schiffer in Erkenntnis 13:171–206, 1978; Sainsbury in Erkenntnis 80:195–214, 2015; Sainsbury, Thinking about things , Oxford University Press, 2018), yet these authors provide no sustained discussion of it. Devitt ( Designation , Columbia University Press, 1981) did formulate a view on which semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference, yet his views are assimilated to causalist views. This is a mistake. While the conventionalized speaker’s reference view captures much of what is plausible in descriptivism and causalism, it remains distinct from both.