Agent-based management and coordination of aircraft at intersections

Abstract

Abstract This work presents a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of coordination and scheduling of aircraft at intersections, with the goal of avoiding conflicts and potential collisions. The proposed algorithm enables simple agents to work together in a way that leads to cooperative behaviors, resulting in equilibria that improve the overall efficiency of the system. The researchers tested and compared the game-theoretic approach with a centralized approach, specifically First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS), using data from Mohammed 5 Casablanca airport. The initial results suggest that the game-theoretic model is promising, despite its higher complexity. The approach has the potential to improve the overall coordination and scheduling of aircraft, leading to a more efficient and safe system. The proposed game-theoretic approach is designed to improve the coordination and scheduling of aircraft at intersections, ultimately leading to a safer and more efficient system. The approach is shown to be promising in initial testing, offering a potentially superior alternative to centralized approaches like FCFS. This research highlights the potential benefits of game-theoretic models in addressing complex coordination problems in multi-agent systems.